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A REVERENT REFLECTION OF THE SPLENDID
SCHOLARSHIP OF MARTIN REDISH—DOES REEXAMINING
COMMERCIAL SPEECH SHED LIGHT ON THE REGRETTABLE
RELIANCE UPON LIE & INSULT IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS?
Douglas W. Kmiec*
INTRODUCTION
Anyone in Professor Martin Redish’s company for even a brief time would per-
ceive a brilliance moderated by humility and an ever-inquiring mind anchored firmly
in principled, syllogistic reasoning. These personal qualities have yielded a scholar
of the first rank at one of America’s elite institutions; a scholar noted for his inspir-
ing commitment to preserving and advancing human freedom under law. Having
first met Professor Redish in preparation for a congressional hearing into a matter
that brought into conflict the freedom of speech and human health, it is fair to say
that many confronting this puzzle might quickly attempt to solve it by the sacrifice
of principled freedom. Indeed, at the time of the hearing as well as this Symposium
honoring him, Professor Redish was asked whether a consideration of consequences
might not allow him to loosen his grip upon freedom if only just this once. “No,”
was the unequivocal response from Professor Redish, not delivered dogmatically,
but only after the most generous consideration of opposing views.
There is abundant wisdom to be found in the Redish body of work, but it is his
defense of what is called here “the major axiom of freedom” that supplies the most
persuasive justification for not leaving commercial speech outside the boundaries
of constitutional protection. The axiom is the idea that:
It is better for a government to make an activity unlawful than
it is to restrict speech about a lawful activity.1
From this major axiom or premise, the benefits of the protection of commercial speech
can be readily deduced: The encouragement of the creative expression of speakers;
the supply of important information to hearers; and by facilitating the essence of
contract—the mutual receipt of consideration by seller and buyer—producing a level
of certainty and material comfort to permit the emergence of the strong middle class
* U.S. Ambassador (ret.); Caruso Family Chair in Constitutional Law & Human Rights,
Pepperdine University.
1 See generally Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism
and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67 (2007) (analyzing
and rejecting claims to limit freedom of commercial speech).
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which Aristotle observed is a necessary element for a successful democracy.2 But
as with all matters of individual right, the protection of right is not absolute, and the
Court has distilled its Redishian-supported judgments in the commercial speech area
with an embrace of an intermediate standard of review.3 Good, but could be better,
responds Professor Redish. According to Professor Redish, to protect commercial
speech only with intermediate scrutiny overlooks implicit content-based choices.4
Even though the Redish argument is well motivated by a desire to once again
enhance human freedom, his major proof—the different treatment of advertising
(speech promoting an economic transaction) from that of product evaluation like
Consumer Reports—ultimately fails to support the obliteration of the commercial
and noncommercial distinction because there are qualitatively different speech
purposes served by advertising and evaluative reporting.5 The Consumer Reports
model is intended to be fact; the other is merely allowance for a fiction that is part
and parcel of the human condition—namely, that while one is permitted to dream
of material satisfaction in a human circumstance, it cannot really be achieved.6 The
continuing dissatisfaction, however, is not a fault of any one seller, but an intrinsic
aspect of the imperfection of all consumers as human beings. There may be a case
for a better human understanding of how things acquired can never be fully expected
to satisfy our restless spirit, but it is not a case facilitated by merging commercial
and noncommercial/political speech under a single strict scrutiny standard.
Nor is it tenable to claim that the judicial elaboration or specification of the
subordinate purposes of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, as
discussed above, impermissibly implicates subject matter or viewpoint censorship,
as it is merely giving definition to the general phraseology of the Constitution—i.e.,
what it means not to “abridge” the freedom of speech. Identifying the historical and
contemporary meanings of constitutional provisions cannot be the basis for strict
scrutiny7 premised upon viewpoint favoritism, or else the Constitution would lack
2 1 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 130–31 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1885).
3 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
4 Redish, supra note 1, at 72–73.
5 See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
6 Tocqueville writes:
The short space of threescore years can never content the imagination
of man; nor can the imperfect joys of this world satisfy his heart. Man
alone, of all created beings, displays a natural contempt of existence,
and yet a boundless desire to exist; he scorns life, but he dreads annihila-
tion. These different feelings incessantly urge his soul to the contempla-
tion of a future state, and religion directs his musings thither. Religion,
then, is simply another form of hope; and it is no less natural to the human
heart than hope itself.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290–91 (Henry Reeve trans., New York,
George Dearborn & Co. 1838).
7 When the government seeks to restrict the content of speech, it is subject to strict
scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015). Under this level of review,
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meaning and all of the Court’s jurisprudence would be impossible. Intermediate scru-
tiny of commercial speech does not render it a low-value or a lesser speech interest, like
obscenity, defamation, etc. Indeed, the four-part Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission8 inquiry facilitates commercial transaction by keeping
expectations within reason—excluding from protection altogether false, fraudulent,
and unlawful activity while still supplying helpful breathing space for sales pitches,
puffery, and other expected exaggerations that fall short of that which is false, fraudu-
lent, or unlawful.9 In conclusion, this inquiry into the appropriate standard of review
for commercial speech confirms the wisdom of Professor Redish’s initial advocacy
in favor of constitutional protection, but not his subsequent argument for strict
scrutiny, even as merging the categories of commercial and noncommercial speech
would make the need for a uniform definition of commercial speech unnecessary.
Had the Court not followed the wise counsel of Professor Redish, it is likely that
the commerce of the United States, domestically and abroad, would have been im-
peded. Excluding the fraudulent and the misleading while keeping open channels
of communication for sometimes embellished consumer information is a pattern of
judicial review that helpfully splits the wholesale deference to regulatory interfer-
ence that was signaled by Justice Holmes in his Lochner v. New York10 dissent,11
without embracing the paternalism of the Justice Peckham majority.12
Making inquiry into how well the intermediate standard protecting commercial
speech works also highlights how the less well-calibrated New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan13 standard advances (or impedes) political speech.14 Without a serious
inquiry into the truth or falsity of political claim, politics is infused with lie and insult.15
Sullivan’s absence of malice formulation as a form of libel extended helpful invita-
tion to the voices of civil rights to not be so litigation risk averse as to be declared by
judges in libel judgments as non-participants.16 That said, the absence of any mean-
ingful judicial inquiry into campaign fabrications and disparagement—by means of
something akin to the multipart Central Hudson test in the commercial area17—leaves
politics at the Wild West level of development. There are reasons for this: Elections
are much fewer in number than commercial transactions so there is less judicial
the government has the burden to prove a restriction on speech is necessary to serve a compelling
interest and that it has employed the least restrictive means of achieving that purpose. Id.
8 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
9 Id. at 562–64.
10 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11 Id. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12 See id. at 57–58 (majority opinion) (dismissing the validity of the labor law at issue, and
remarking on the power of the people and power of the state being at odds).
13 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14 See infra Part VI.
15 See infra Part IX.
16 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring in result).
17 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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opportunity to structure a possible check on political lie and insult. Fashioning such
a check in the political context, of course, is more difficult since—unlike most com-
mercial matters where ideology shapes little—in the political arena, ideology is almost
always present, and especially so in an era like the present where concepts of
common good are seldom mentioned, let alone understood. In brief, Sullivan has
been assumed to keep regulatory conceptions of the common good at bay, even as
that assumption was pressed for justification by the avalanche of lies and hate that
infected the 2016 presidential contest.
Here, the Court’s free speech jurisprudence from other contexts—including the
commercial context—might be called upon. Redish helped disclose how judicial
deference on the appropriateness of economic regulation did not necessarily beget
deference on the regulation of speech associated with the economic or commercial
matter.18 The major Redish axiom again instructs that it may be correct policy to
restrict bakers’ hours—that is for the legislature to decide—but that does not mean
the legislature controls the testimony, public speaking, and editorial writing that can
contribute to the public mind on the overall policy concern. In a moment, we will
look back at a Congress that, without Redishian insight, found it difficult to moder-
ate its regulatory appetite in ways that distinguished oversight of conduct from
constitutional limits on that oversight.19 At the end of this brief Essay, we will explore
whether there are not similar differentiations to be drawn with regard to lie and
insult in political campaigns. Specifically, relying upon an analytical differentiation
between the censorship of political expression from cases that articulate a compel-
ling interest in the integrity of the electoral process holds some promise.20 The
promise is somewhat obscured by a strained acceptance of a claimed “search for truth”
value of lying as well as methodical confusion of how the Court treats low value
speech. As to the former, the Court’s divided opinion in United States v. Alvarez21
troublingly finds some remote protectable value in the lie—a value, if it exists, that
is more fanciful than real.22 Also in this low value or no value speech mix of consid-
erations is whether the Roberts Court is really in support of “closed categories” of
unprotected or low speech, or whether that is merely a rhetorical sleight of hand that
hides the balancing of government and individual interest.
Without giving away too much of the story too early, the inquiry of the Symposium
into the Redish achievement with respect to commercial speech protection is less
18 See generally Redish, supra note 1 (discussing those views that would allow for lesser
rights to commercial speech under the First Amendment, and rejecting each view).
19 See infra Part I.
20 For an interesting comment on the revival of a long dormant statute to address false
campaign speech in the context of an initiative, see William A. Williams, A Necessary Com-
promise: Protecting Electoral Integrity Through the Regulation of False Campaign Speech,
52 S.D. L. REV. 321 (2007).
21 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 2546–47.
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instructive as to how to handle the corrupting influences of truly low value speech—
lie and insult—in political campaigns. Nevertheless, while the Court divides the
speech referenced in the First Amendment into categories to allow for more efficient
and consistent judicial monitoring of what Madison called the “bulwarks of liberty,”23
and while I am persuaded that the categories of commercial and noncommercial
speech ought usefully remain separate, no category of speech can be entirely isolated
from all others. The evolution of the protectibility of commercial speech is worthy
of canvass for that reason alone. With political discourse at the historical core of the
First Amendment, it is too glib and self-defeating to simply allow the flood of the
false and the insulting to dissuade citizens from participation. In the near term, re-
calling the greater latitude the government has as speaker or subsidizer of speech
may support a shaming or labeling regime familiar to human rights practice where
the judicial enforcement is in its infancy. Nominally, at least, shaming would be
more consistent with First Amendment values and the desire for an informed, civil
discourse in the consideration of political candidates. Yet, the inherent difficulty of
distinguishing legitimate government program condition from unconstitutional con-
dition suggests that relying on government speech to fairly and neutrally evaluate
the lie/hate/attack side of the human personality that seems attracted to political
campaigns is to expect the fox to dispassionately comment on the well-being of the
chickens in the hen house. At the very least, perhaps the Symposium will encourage
Professor Redish or one of his many acolytes to take up the quandary of how po-
litical speech can be immunized from content censorship without the acceptance of
the corrupting and democracy-destroying lie and insult. But before launching into
these present considerations, a reexamination of commercial speech history from a
participant’s view is relevant.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE DOCK OF CONGRESS
In 1986, a decade and a half after the important scholarly work of Professor Martin
Redish24 provided—on several cited occasions—the intellectual support for the Su-
preme Court to bring commercial speech under the protection of the First Amend-
ment,25 members of Congress were pressing hard to push back on that protection—at
23 James Madison, Adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution, Speech in Congress (June 8,
1789), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 164, 167 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006).
24 Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971) (advocating for freedom
of speech within commercial speech under the First Amendment).
25 Prior to the work of Professor Redish, the Supreme Court had opined that the Con-
stitution imposed no restraint on the government’s regulation of commercial advertising. See
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (stating there are no restraints on gov-
ernment regulation of purely commercial speech), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976) (rejecting the idea that
commercial speech has no protection).
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least with respect to tobacco advertising.26 The legislative effort was partially char-
acterized as pitting the health of millions of children against the cold-hearted, crass
profit-maximizing of Madison Avenue.27 Congress was being asked not whether it
should be lawful to sell tobacco products to children (and for that matter adults), but
whether saying things to make the practice attractive to those children (or adults)
could be censored.28 In more prosaic terms, it was argued that the advertising of
tobacco companies was attracting new and, in many cases, young recruits to a prod-
uct with addictive and possibly fatal effects.29
The Congressional action to censor tobacco speech was strongly supported by
President Reagan’s Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, who could point to multiple
medical studies detailing the risk of emphysema, lung diseases of all types, and of
course, cancer.30 Dr. Koop was not a reticent man, and, insofar as Congress was
petitioning his testimony, he was anxious to provide it.31 There was a strong rumor
(denied by Koop) that the White House Chief of Staff, Donald T. Regan, had sought
to block or temper Koop’s testimony.32 Part of the Chief of Staff’s concern, maybe
all of it, was aimed at assisting corporate interests who had supported President
Reagan in his campaign.33 Tobacco money had a history of supporting many presi-
dents, but here there was something more. In particular, the news reporting and
journalistic efforts of every publication from the New York Times to the now defunct
Newsweek were heavily dependent upon tobacco advertising money.34 In those pre-
Internet days, which in just a few short years would challenge the hardcopy press
in even greater ways, the lack of commercial money to support a robust news gather-
ing and reporting enterprise raised real and inescapable concerns for free speech in
plain and bottom line ways.
Koop testified nonetheless, and so did I. A photo appearing in Advertising Age
caught Dr. Koop scowling during my testimony explaining the legal objection that
26 Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147, 1178–79
(1996).
27 See generally Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health & the Env’t of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong. (1986) (discussing the
competing issues on regulation of tobacco advertisements).
28 Id. at 2 (statement of Henry A. Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 333–41 (testimony of Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the United States).
31 See Laralyn Sasaki, Blocked from One Hearing, He’ll Appear Aug. 1: Surgeon General
to Testify on Tobacco, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1896, at 25 (discussing Koop’s call for a “smokeless
society” and his role in testifying before Congress).
32 Id. (discussing Donald T. Regan’s role in blocking Koop’s testimony at a House meet-
ing, and Koop’s claim it was a mutual decision).
33 See Letter from Ronald Reagan to J.C. Galloway, Tobacco Farmer (Sept. 24, 1980),
http://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=rxky0146 [https://perma
.cc/3XJN-7ZBH].
34 Elizabeth M. Whelan, When Newsweek and Time Filtered Cigarette Copy, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 1, 1984, at 1.
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gave preference to the First Amendment over the health concerns. The photo might
as well have been labeled “if looks could kill,” with Dr. Koop’s stare requiring its
own surgeon general’s warning. The White House was only too delighted to learn
that contrary to Dr. Koop, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) saw “constitutional
problems” with the proposed tobacco advertising ban.35 Those familiar with OLC-
speak knew that meant a possible veto recommendation. In this case, a veto recom-
mendation aligning the President of the United States with the forward-thinking
Martin Redish view of the First Amendment.
The Redish view was on the ascendancy, and judicial decisions extending con-
stitutional protection in commercial speech contexts were multiple in number. At
some length at the hearing, I gave a Redish-informed case-by-case recitation of how
prior to the late 1970s any rational basis for regulation could curtail commercial
speech within the usual deferential framework that the Court brings to economic
regulation.36 Because of the influential writing of Professor Redish, the standard of
review for restrictions like the advertising ban being considered was higher, but how
much higher? The proponents of the legislation could arguably show a rational basis
between a ban on advertising and some reduction in use (a contested point since the
industry had its own experts who saw advertising as principally having intra-product
brand effects).37 Any curtailment of tobacco product use, and in particular the discour-
agement of new young users, could both hypothetically be substantial governmental
interests; but would banning advertisement of tobacco products directly advance
those interests? And was a ban the least restrictive way to advance those interests?
As we prepared for the congressional hearing, the answers to these questions
were clouded by the Court’s decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico.38 The Posadas decision, which has today been all but formally
overruled,39 accepted the regulatory effort to keep casino advertising from encourag-
ing local gaming while promoting it to tourists.40 Notwithstanding the major Redish
axiom that the power to ban the activity is not de facto greater than the power to
manipulate the speech concerning lawful activity, the Posadas Court accepted the
“fit” of the regulation as construed in the lower court even as it did not address other
forms of gaming or apply to all people evenhandedly.41 In brief, the Court in Posadas
sustained the selective regulation of protected speech about a lawful activity.42
35 Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 348 (1986) (testimony of
Douglas W. Kmiec, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.).
36 Id. at 345–47.
37 Id. at 708–09 (statement of Roger D. Blackwell, PhD) (stating that tobacco ad-
vertisements affected current smokers, but did not convince new people to begin smoking—
including children).
38 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
39 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996) (plurality opinion).
40 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332–33, 344.
41 Id. at 341–44.
42 Id. at 344.
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As noted, Posadas would prove to be an outlier and a misapplication of the
four-part Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard,43 but of course, we could
not know that for certain at the time. It was unusual to ask the President to signal
veto in any situation; it was doubly unusual for the OLC to place the President in the
position of potentially vetoing congressional legislation on the basis of a constitu-
tional theory not (yet) fully subscribed to by the Supreme Court. And while exercis-
ing a veto would—as a collateral consequence—help publishers meet their budgets,
the beneficiaries of those budgets would be styling the veto as “President Signs
Children’s Death Warrant,” or something equally hard for the President’s political
advisors to accept casually. Of course, the President can veto legislation on any
basis with the only relevant question then whether or not the President has a suffi-
cient number of votes in Congress to sustain the veto. It was not the OLC’s role to
pay attention to the President’s political popularity. Instead, if the President chose
to be his own source of constitutional meaning, the OLC would naturally assume its
special obligation to assist in Presidential explanation. The OLC placed considerable
reliance upon Professor Redish’s scholarship.44
Because the subordinate inquiry of this Essay is the much regretted ubiquity of
lie and insult in political campaign, let me pause to give emphasis to the far different
level of civility in political discourse, including the respect held by all sides for each
other’s differing points of view in the 1980s. In this regard, while recalling the
Redish-OLC collaboration of years past is interesting for its academic perspective
on free speech, it also illustrates the importance of having an office within the ex-
ecutive branch devoted to legal decision-making, not legal policy. An office, capable
of reasoned judgment that respects both presidential direction and judicial interpreta-
tion, but does not see its judgment as wholly one or the other, helps to maintain a
commitment to the rule of law that is much needed around the globe, and that is
irreplaceable within our own system. The tobacco problem was a politically charged
one, but the discussion stayed at a high level within the executive branch as well as
between the executive and Congress (and indirectly the Court). In that way, this
retelling is hoped to supply a tonic for the public mind that frankly is weary from
the vacuity of what today passes for substance even at the presidential level. Finally,
and relatedly, the entire episode illustrates the importance of accepting the knowability
43 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 509–10.
44 Professor Koppelman assails the Redish axiom as a product of “tunnel constructivism.”
Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Construction in Free Speech Theory, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 647, 648–49, 729 (2013). In particular, Koppelman relies on Milton and Mill
to bring into legal argumentation—even that rigorously applying syllogistic logic—the con-
sequences of choosing one legal doctrine over another. Id. at 691–92, 695–96, 698, 730. That
may sound unexceptional except that it is bound up with modern day controversies over inter-
pretative theory and the separation of powers considerations that keep courts from becoming,
as the late Justice Scalia remarked in a different context, “junior varsity Congress.” Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the law of the Constitution and not indulging the skeptical notion planted early
in much of legal education that any position can be argued for, and what will prevail
is not a matter of law, but persuasiveness, personality, or personal connection.45
II. ABANDONING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND
NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH?
Returning to the main inquiry, Professor Redish argues that it is time for the
Court to take the next step and treat commercial and noncommercial speech alike.
It is increasingly rare to find scholars who would treat commercial speech as it was
pre-Redish: a subordinate aspect of economic regulation meriting minimal judicial
oversight. That said, there is formidable opposition to extending freedom of ex-
pression to commercial entities.46 Professor Tamara Piety is one of the strongest
voices in opposition. Professor Piety subscribes to the view of the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist that the metaphor of corporate personhood cannot endow corporations
with the mind, will, and emotions of an actual person.47 Professor Piety writes:
As a non-human entity, a corporation lacks the expressive
interests related to self-actualization and freedom that human
beings possess by virtue of being human. Human beings are moral
subjects and ends in themselves. Corporations are not. And despite
45 Far more than a ban on tobacco advertising turns on the OLC treasuring and preserving
that legal frame of mind. Just consider how essential the affirmation of legal truth’s existence
was to conveying to President Reagan that he had not made a timely report to Congress of
a finding supporting the Iranian arms transaction that yielded revenue that ended up in the
hands of the Contras, S. REP. NO. 100-216, at 9 (1987); or less dramatically, but equally im-
portant to the maintenance of the separation of powers, the ability to convey to the president
that he lacked inherent authority to item veto provisions in omnibus legislation, Paul M.
Johnson, Line-Item Veto, GLOSSARY POL. ECON. TERMS, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm
/gloss/line-item_veto [https://perma.cc/8UY5-SAUT]; or the OLC’s consistent defense of fed-
eralism even when the underlying state policy was contrary to one’s point of view. Subse-
quently, and more consequential, for individuals, the determination that the OLC itself had
incorrectly and unfairly written a legal opinion that excluded those diagnosed with AIDS
from federal program participation, Anti-Bias Law Extended for AIDS Sufferers, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 6, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-06/news/mn-4513_1_anti-discrimination
-laws [https://perma.cc/U2TF-7J66]. In all of these cases, the OLC was seeking a legal con-
ception of the truth of the law as it existed prior to the query submitted by the President, the
Attorney General, or a cabinet secretary as in essence the executive department’s general coun-
sel for legal determination.
46 See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2583 (2008). Professor Piety identifies a number of colleagues who see things her
way including C. Edwin Baker, Daniel Greenwood, Fred Schauer, Steve Shiffrin, Roger
Schiner, Lawrence Soley, and Lawrence Mitchell. Id. at 2584 n.4.
47 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822–23, 825, 828 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Piety, supra note 46, at 2585.
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the extension to corporations of personhood, that personhood has
not extended to courts concluding that they are entitled to all of
the same protections applicable to human beings.48
Professor Redish makes a variety of arguments in favor of raising the category
of commercial speech into a higher standard of review. He sees the application of
strict scrutiny as the natural result of his axiom that regulation of speech is not a
lesser included element of legislative authority to render the underlying activity un-
lawful.49 The axiom has been mentioned several times already, but if its worthiness
needs further witness, the reader might consider the accountability or transparency
the axiom facilitates. For example, it may be reasonable to suppose that a proposal
to ban the use of a product altogether can be counted upon to provoke a lively public
debate on its own; whereas, the details of an advertising ban would often be evaluated
at a far less visible, and often bureaucratic, level. Yet, the value of the Redish axiom
accomplishes this objective of accountability, as well as its earlier stated importance of
carrying out First Amendment purposes under the intermediate standard of review.
What is missing from Professor Redish’s argumentation is why the Central Hudson
formulation fails to honor his axiom.50
A review of the literature suggests that virtually all of the participants in the stan-
dard of review debate with Professor Redish concede the commercial/noncommercial
line as one that is not always easy to discern.51 Nevertheless, Professor Redish claims
that his objection is rooted in something more fundamental than uncertainty: Namely
that in measuring regulatory fit, the Court misses the point that intermediate review,
itself, is a disguised form of viewpoint discrimination.52 Professor Redish attempts
48 Piety, supra note 46, at 2646 (footnote omitted). Professor Piety believes that corporate
speech is one-sided advocacy and therefore the justification of wanting to deliver valuable
information to consumers necessarily must be checked by an inquiry into the truth of the
corporate statements made. Id. at 2623. The other purposes of free speech—speaker creativity
and facilitating democratic self-participation, argues Piety—do not transfer to commercial
speech. See id. at 2588. Might there not be a difference between the commercial speech en-
gaged in by individuals and corporate commercial speech?
49 See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1440–42
(1980) (arguing against Justice Rehnquists’s opinion in Posadas that claimed the ability to
regulate an activity included the lesser ability to regulate the speech of that activity).
50 The Court has declined arguments in favor of merging commercial and noncommercial
speech and subjecting it all to strict scrutiny. See generally, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (invalidating a Massachusetts regulation outlawing outdoor
tobacco advertising of smokeless tobacco or cigars within 1,000 feet of schools or play-
grounds. Rather than apply strict scrutiny, the Court applied the third and fourth prongs of
the Central Hudson test and specifically rejected the tobacco company’s arguments that
exposure to advertising by the young does not increase underage use of tobacco products).
51 See, e.g., Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58
MD. L. REV. 55, 56 (1999).
52 Redish, supra note 49, at 1444–45.
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to illustrate his point by drawing a comparison between how the Court would apply
strict scrutiny to any legislated censorship of evaluative and comparative materials—
like the pages of Consumer Reports (presenting arguably objective evaluations of
products)—but not commercial advertising or marketing (which promotes a product
without at the same time revealing imperfection or shortcoming).53 In light of this,
Professor Redish argues that maintaining the commercial/ noncommercial distinction
“gives rise, ironically in the name of the First Amendment, to the most universally
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression: suppression based on the
regulators’ subjective disagreement with or disdain for the views being expressed.”54
Professor Redish’s point is a clever one, but is it persuasive? Is it of the same
level of magnitude as his initial efforts to bring commercial speech within the First
Amendment’s protection altogether? Frankly, it is not, since it mixes apples and
oranges; a Consumer Reports–type magazine is not commercial speech—that is,
speech promoting acquisition or sale of products or services, which is not what is
going on within its pages. The publishers of the magazine are interested in selling
the magazine, and advertisements for it would be commercial speech, but product
tests and other evaluations of other products or services offered by others are not.
This material is the equivalent of scientific studies done in a university research lab.
A positive report may convince a purchaser to prefer one product over another, but
unless the evaluation was bought, licitly or illicitly by the manufacturer or seller, its
purpose is not the consummation of a sale of a given product. The fact that the pages
contain information about goods or services that may become the subjects of
commercial transactions no more makes them commercial speech than news cover-
age in the business pages of the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal reporting
the news of, say, the latest Samsung phone fire. True, various courts, including the
Supreme Court itself, have employed looser or variant definitions of commercial
speech, but it has long been accepted that a key element of the definition is speech
related to the proposal of an economic transaction.55
III. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: HOSTILE OR HELPFUL TO CAPITALISM?
Categorizing his opponents as rationalist, intuitionist, or ideological, Professor
Redish sees all three as manifesting a hostility “to capitalism and its logical out-
growths or implications.”56 There are numerous reasons to be both praiseworthy as
53 Id.
54 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 77 (2013).
55 See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014) (citations omitted).
56 Redish, supra note 1, at 68–69. Professor Redish attempts to bolster his position in favor
of strict scrutiny by putting legal scholars into two camps: Those who are not known as strong
defenders of the First Amendment, and those scholars and jurists associated with a more
protective approach toward free expression. See id. at 69, 110 (discussing the viewpoint-
based regulation done by his opponents that he feels damages First Amendment protections).
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well as skeptical of the capitalist enterprise. In comparison to the inefficiencies of
command and control economies, the extended order of capitalism (as Hayek would
put it) gets scarce resources into the hands that value them most.57 On the opposing
side, capitalism’s major flaw is the subordination of the human person to the
material. This is an important, if brief, reference to political divides that have been
with us at least since the industrial revolution, if not before. But how opposing strict
scrutiny for commercial speech coincides with that ideology is unclear. After all, to
the extent that higher scrutiny would mean a greater need for regulatory justification
on the part of government regulators, it would be reasonable to suppose that free
marketers would join with Professor Redish since the likelihood of regulatory suc-
cess would presumably be less in light of the greater justification required.
Moreover, the intermediate standard does have a practical business value; specifi-
cally, it allows for some important play in the joints in sale presentation. Unlawful
or fraudulent products or services have no speech protection, but the intermediate
standard allows for the sales pitch—that is, an admixture of useful, factual informa-
tion describing the product along with performance anecdotes and other puffery that
consumers expect, but usually taken with a grain of salt.58 In other words, consumers
count on not being defrauded, but also are mature enough to not have their expecta-
tions unduly raised by the sale person’s personal testimonials or the word “sale,”
itself, which often means the seller has made a minor adjustment in mark-up.
Professor Redish does articulate a legitimate concern with what he describes as
“indirect or furtive viewpoint-based discrimination.”59 Yet his examples and concerns
are either easily met by the present jurisprudence of intermediate review, or they would
be resolved by a limited application of strict scrutiny on argumentation akin to that
of Justice Scalia applying heightened protection in R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul.60 to
nominally unprotected but not uniformly treated hate speech.61 For example, Professor
Redish poses a hypothetical ordinance in the city of Chicago limiting the distribu-
tion of anti-war literature on Michigan Avenue during rush hour.62 The ordinance has
obvious safety and traffic considerations beneath it, but of course its topical limitation
to those against the war is wholly viewpoint-based as is, under recent precedent, the
This categorization of jurists and scholars leaning for and against free speech is unhelpful,
for without an agreed midpoint reliably separating what is progressive from what is conserva-
tive in each speech context, it is subjective labeling.
57 1 F. A. HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF F. A. HAYEK 6 (W.W. Bartley III ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1988); see, e.g., Matt Zwolinski,
The Ethics of Price Gouging, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 347, 351–53 (2008) (illustrating the prin-
ciple in regards to laws against price gouging).
58 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64
(1980).
59 Redish, supra note 1, at 71.
60 505 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1992).
61 Id.
62 Redish, supra note 1, at 71.
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limitation to the subject of warfare.63 The Court identifies subject matter discrimina-
tion and viewpoint censorship as two forms of potentially unconstitutional discrimi-
nations on speech.64 In any case, that the regulation of commercial speech generally
is the purview of intermediate review should not mean that the government can draw
regulatory lines in a way that is calculated to censor the commercial speaker on
viewpoint or subject matter grounds. If unprotected speech must nevertheless not be
subject to viewpoint or subject matter favoritism or dis-favoritism,65 commercial
speech should be likewise evaluated. Thus, the under-inclusive distinctions would
easily fail. Yet, the point being made is that such a poorly drawn commercial speech
regulation would also fall to intermediate scrutiny. An ordinance that prohibits the
distribution of a leaflet promoting the sale of oranges, but not apples (without some
explanatory context), would hardly seem to be directly advancing a substantial govern-
mental interest. The point is one does not need to elevate all of commercial speech
to the most protected category in order to reach these impermissible distinctions.
IV. DEMOCRACY IN A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SENSE?
Redish disagrees with the late Judge Bork’s historical claim that limits protected
freedom of speech to political discourse.66 Sliding past the contentious arguments
over original understanding, Redish posits that were political discourse to be seen
as the only protected subject matter, then he would propose redefining the meaning
of political discourse.67 Substantively, the Redish insight here is quite astute recog-
nizing that it is not just self-government in a collective or public sense that is relevant
to political discussion, but also self-government in terms of self-determination in a
private sense. Professor Redish writes:
I have concluded that it makes absolutely no sense to protect
speech relevant to a situation where the individual has a minuscule
fraction of the say in the outcome [(the quadrennial presidential
election, for example)] while simultaneously refusing to protect
speech that will facilitate choices by the private individual that
are solely her own.68
The Redish insight recognizes that the individual exercises his or her freedom in the
context of multiple communities, and some of the most important are very close at
hand—e.g., public schools as well as land use and environmental proceedings
63 Id. at 71–72.
64 Id. at 72–73.
65 Cf. R. A. V., 505 U.S. at 386.
66 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592–93 (1982).
67 Id. at 600.
68 Redish, supra note 1, at 81.
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conducted by thousands of local governments. The Redish reformulation is provoca-
tive, but it must be more than ipse dixit if it is to withstand the interpretive sniping
of devoted originalists. In any case, the clever redefinition does not meaningfully
advance the idea why commercial speech should be raised from the intermediate
standard of review.
Professor Redish’s response to Judge Bork is creative, in itself, and there is much
to commend a wider conception of political discourse in the twenty-first century.
However, if we accept Judge Bork’s historical understanding of politics and political
discourse, this would place all forms of advertising as well as Consumer Reports–
type evaluations and considerably more currently protected speech outside the
umbrella of constitutional protection. The narrow historical understanding of free
speech would unite commercial and noncommercial speech together but in a way
that Professor Redish would certainly regret—most all speech would then be subject
to regulatory restriction.
V. LIE & INSULT IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
At last, turning again as we did in the beginning to the topic of lie and insult in
political campaigns, does the exploration of the treatment of commercial and non-
commercial speech and the appropriate standard of review yield helpful insight? As
a purely descriptive matter, the exploration underscores that lies about soap are
easier to address than the lies of the proverbial soap box. The qualified, intermediate
protection of commercial speech provides both for the exclusion of misleading,
untruthful, and unlawful product claims; by contrast, the strict scrutiny applied to
the protection of political speech has resulted in just the opposite: the facilitation of
lie and insult as protected forms of speech. If we assume speech has its same
orientation and purposes in the political arena as in the commercial, the protection
of lie and insult is at best a facetious claim of speaker “creativity,” which merely
begs the question of its compatability with both the misdirection of political con-
sumers, and almost nonexistent consideration of the corrupting nature of lie and
insult to the overall democratic process.
The chances of being politically defrauded far exceed the commercial odds of
falling victim to a commercial lie. Yet, in contrast to the commercial setting, there is
no assurance of truth in political advertising or regulatory commitment to incentivize
accountability at the federal level beyond the cumbersome and highly technical FEC
regulation of campaign contributions.69 At the state level, efforts to regulate false
campaign speech is often defeated by the dicta in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.70
Not only does the existing positive law leave unregulated this type of bad behavior,
69 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2012).
70 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); State ex rel. Pub. Disclo-
sure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 695 (Wash. 1998) (citing N.Y. Times
Co. in its rejection to allow regulation of political speech based on claims of truthfulness).
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but also, in some ways, it can be said to mandate it. In this regard, the Federal
Communications Act71 mandates that broadcasters accept political ads in an uncen-
sored form even in cases where broadcasters believe that some of the claims are
false or misstated. For example, in 1972, the FCC compelled acceptance of an ad-
vertisement from J.B. Stoner, a self-proclaimed white racist running for the United
States Senate under the so-called National State Rights party.72 Stoner’s ad claimed
that African Americans, specified therein by the N-word, were advocating integration
out of the sexual desire for white women.73 Under FCC rules, advertisements can be
refused for technical reasons—their poor quality or lack of fit within an allotted time
slot—but short of refusing all advertisements for all candidates for a given office,
false political speech is without present or workable remedy.74
First-year law students are uniformly instructed in the venerable case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. New York Times Co. deployed the First Amendment to modify
the common-law action of libel to create a judicially crafted exemption from liability
for falsehoods regarding a public official75—widened later to false statements about
private individuals caught up in a matter of public concern.76 Henceforth, unless in-
corporation of inaccurate material could be shown to result from “actual malice” or
“reckless disregard” for the facts, it would not give rise to remedy.77 The Supreme
Court articulated in 1971 that “it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee
[of free speech] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct
of campaigns for public office.”78
VI. PROSECUTING FALSE CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING?
Nevertheless, frustrated with the feckless ways for citizens to express their dis-
appointment, if not outrage, that lies and insults have become commonplace in the
modern political campaign, it has been argued that drafting a false campaign adver-
tising statute is possible, provided it is limited to statements that are negligently made
and proven to be false by clear and convincing evidence.79 The negligence require-
ment reflects the fact that in an Internet-centered world it is too easy to find support
even for false statements.80 Arguably, candidates should be able to rely only upon
sources that they have proven to be credible after reasonable investigation. Of course,
71 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).
72 Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).
73 Id. at 636.
74 See 47 U.S.C. § 315.
75 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
76 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376–77, 390–91 (1967).
77 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
78 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
79 Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82
TUL. L. REV. 889, 908 & n.146 (2008).
80 Id. at 906.
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even the negligence standard pulls back on New York Times Co.81 There is a differ-
ence in context between a third party placement of an editorial advertisement, as in
New York Times Co., and lies and insults in a campaign, but it is far from clear that
the contextual difference allows a greater likelihood for limiting political speech in
a campaign. Indeed, even as the facts of New York Times Co. suggested a context
of relative tranquility (the editorial offices of a newspaper), the rationale or aim of
the Court was the rough and tumble of political campaign.
There is also the problematic nature of giving remedy. In most cases, there will
be an inability to litigate a question to its conclusion during an election. An imper-
fect solution might be to provide financial sanctions and prominent publication of
that liability in a long-term hope to rid politics of lie and insult, but obviously, the
sanctions would have particular effect with respect to career politicians.
There have been a number of states that have flirted with statutes aimed at false
political advertisements.82 In a Minnesota case, the candidate argued that had his
opponent not opposed a particular measure, a certain rape would not have occurred.83
The rape was particularly offensive, involving a mother and two daughters who had
been kidnapped and raped repeatedly over a period of two days.84 The candidate’s
claim, however, was factually wrong because the legislative measure would not have
applied to previous convictions.85 The Minnesota law was interpreted as requiring a
publisher to have “reason to believe” that an advertisement was false before the pub-
lisher could reject it.86 The Minnesota standard was held inconsistent with New York
Times Co.’s actual malice requirement.87
Another case from Washington State related to several misstatements concerning
a state ballot proposition authorizing assisted suicide or “death with dignity.”88 The
Washington State Supreme Court invalidated the law89 authorizing the prosecution
81 See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
82 Brooks Jackson, False Ads: There Oughta Be a Law!—Or Maybe Not, FACTCHECK
.ORG (May 10, 2007), http://www.factcheck.org/2004/06/false-ads-there-oughta-be-a-law-or
-maybe-not/ [https://perma.cc/UD95-C3GD].
83 State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 752.
86 Id. at 753.
87 Id. at 753–54.
88 State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 693
(Wash. 1998).
89 Id. at 699. Curiously, the Washington Supreme Court struck down the statute even
though it facially complied with New York Times Co.’s requirements of both actual malice
and clear and convincing burden of proof. See id.; see also id. (Guy, J., concurring). The
court accurately found that a false campaign statute could be differentiated from a defamation
law, insofar as defamation largely concerned statements made by one person against another,
and is designed to protect the property of an individual or his good name. Id. at 697. Then,
however, the court suggested that in the context of a campaign for an initiative or proposi-
tion, and perhaps political campaigns generally, “the grossest misstatements, deceptions, and
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of false political advertising.90 The majority of the court observed that the best
remedy for false speech is more speech.91 This has been the standard response, of
course, even as it seems qualitatively anemic in light of the scope of the lies and
insults that now pervade American politics. In the words of the concurring judge in
the Washington State case, the majority had been “shockingly oblivious to the in-
creasing nastiness of modern American political campaigns.”92
In DeWine v. Ohio Elections Commission,93 an Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the
Ohio false campaign speech law by applying strict scrutiny.94 The court determined
that “[t]here is indeed a compelling state interest in preventing the publication of
false statements concerning candidates for election to office where such statements are
purposely published with full knowledge of the falsity thereof and are designed to
promote the election or defeat of a candidate for office.”95
VII. LIES & INSULTS—CATEGORICAL BALANCING?
In cases dealing with low value speech (of which, remember, commercial speech
is not), the Supreme Court of the United States has alternated between declaring cate-
gories of low value speech to be altogether closed or opening them by engaging in the
balancing of the individual and public interest. The categorization approach is most
often associated with the mostly unapplied, but not formally overruled, “fighting
words” doctrine in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire96where the Court wrote:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not abso-
lute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting”
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
defamations are immune from legal sanction unless they violate private rights—that is, unless
individuals are defamed.” Id. (quoting Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:
A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992)). The court rejected the need for an
informed electorate, calling that “patronizing and paternalistic.” Id. at 698.
90 Id. at 693.
91 Id. at 696.
92 Id. at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
93 399 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
94 Id. at 103.
95 Id.
96 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.97
The prospects for addressing political falsehood went down appreciably when
the Supreme Court invalidated the Stolen Valor Act98 in United States v. Alvarez.99
Alvarez made a number of false claims in public meetings as a board member of the
Three Valley Water District Board, including that he had been awarded the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor.100 Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality that included the
Chief Justice as well as Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, argued for a strong
presumption against any restriction of speech or the widening of the prohibited
categories.101 Alvarez’s protection of the low value speech—at best advances the
license of the speaker—is without sensitivity to the misdirection of the listener and
its debasing of democracy. Troublingly, Alvarez is consistent with other recent deci-
sions, most particularly, United States v. Stevens,102 an animal cruelty case, and
Snyder v. Phelps,103 upholding highly offensive protests at military funerals in brutal
disregard of the emotions of surviving family.104 The dissent in Alvarez and the
related low-value speech decisions have been principally left to Justice Alito, who
would have applied a balancing approach.105 The dissent’s view was unacceptable,
said the plurality, because it relied upon “a free-floating test for First Amendment
coverage” and in essence would empower judges to add to a prohibited category
whenever the value of speech was outweighed by the harms that it caused.106 Scholars
dispute whether the Roberts Court is actually adhering to a categorical framework
or is hiding within its categorical statements a balancing methodology.107
97 Id. at 571–72 (internal footnotes omitted).
98 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c) (2012) (amended 2013).
99 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion).
100 Id. at 2542.
101 Id. at 2547.
102 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
103 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
104 Id. at 460–61.
105 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 2544 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 490).
107 Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65
EMORY L.J. 495, 496–97 (2015). Professor Tsesis argues that even though the Supreme Court
appears to have adopted a more categorical approach, in fact, it is continuing to balance. Id.
The author supports balancing but would like the Court to undertake a more comprehensive
balancing effort that would meet its concern with ad hoc balancing but not eliminate the proper
consideration of individual context. Id. at 497. Thus, employing rhetoric reminiscent of how
commercial speech is treated under the four-part test in Central Hudson, the author argues that
the Court should evaluate whether a particular restriction on speech arises from constitutional,
statutory, or common law interests; “whether the restricted expression has historically and
traditionally been constitutionally protected;” the nature, breadth, and strength of general
welfare policies that lie behind the speech restriction; the fit between the objective and regu-
lation; and whether there are other less restrictive means to achieve the goals. Id. at 529.
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VIII. LEARNING FROM EUROPE
Balancing is indeed the methodology prevalent in the European Court of Human
Rights. Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Everyone
has the right to freedom of expression. . . . includ[ing the] freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.”108 The capacious protection of Article 10 is
balanced by Article 17 providing that no “State, group or person [has the] right to
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein.”109 What Article 17 attempts to do according
to the Council of Europe is: “guarantee[ ] the preservation of the system of demo-
cratic values underpinning the convention notably by preventing totalitarian groups
from exercising the rights . . . set[ ] [by the convention] in a way to destroy the rights
and liberties established by the convention itself.”110
The 2016 presidential campaign in the United States seems to have needed some-
thing akin to the Article 17 counterbalance built into the European Convention—
namely, an understanding that rights correlate with duties if they are to continue to
be protective of human freedoms. As Article 17 indicates, there must be an exercise
of right in a manner that does not destroy the concept of rights and liberty, itself.
Professor Redish in informal colloquy at the Symposium revealed little affinity
for the European approach.111 In this regard, it is not surprising to find Professor
Redish, in his role as free speech champion, generally to perceive the type of Article
17 balancing to be much desired in the abstract but much feared in application. The
fear derives from the begged question: Namely, who will determine falsehood and,
even more fundamentally, by what means and standard would such determination
be made? “European countries historically have restricted hate speech through both
criminal and civil law, and, pursuant to European Directive, all EU member states
must criminalize ‘serious manifestations of racism and xenophobia’ and to make
such expression punishable by ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.’”112
108 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889.
109 Id. at art. 17.
110 COUNCIL OF EUR., FACTSHEET: HATE SPEECH 2 (2009), http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc
.jsp?p=&id=1477721&direct=true [https://perma.cc/9FGX-VDQW].
111 In presenting this Paper last after a long day of excellent, but exhausting, intellectual
sparring, it is possible I mistook Professor Redish’s head movement as disapproval of the Euro-
pean counter-balance in Article 17 when he was merely nodding off, but it is unlikely. Cer-
tainly, the EU approach runs logically counter to Professor Redish’s advocacy of raising the
standard of review for the legal evaluation of regulation of commercial speech to strict scrutiny
which, unlike the import of Article 17, would narrow rather than broaden regulatory discretion.
112 Robert Corn-Revere, Hate Speech Laws: Ratifying the Assassin’s Veto, 791 CATO INST.
May 24, 2016, at 1, 7 (quoting Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Ex-
pressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law, EUR-LEX (June 15, 2014),
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The directive can be contrasted with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to either
liberally construe the categories of low value speech or engage in a more forthright
balancing of competing interests that would sustain greater restriction.
May a governmental entity consistent with the First Amendment fairly limit or
restrict lie and insult without appearing, or actually being, partisan? Again, the
scholarly opinion is divided. Professor William Marshall writes, “[c]urrently, a number
of legal sanctions are available, at least in theory, to redress excesses in campaign
speech. These sanctions include individual defamation and privacy actions for damages
and state unfair campaign practice restrictions that directly penalize the dissemina-
tion of false and misleading campaign speech.”113 Yet, Marshall’s thoughtful research
also indicates that the Supreme Court approach has been “erratic at best.”114
IX. THE INTEGRITY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
What may seem “erratic” in the Court’s jurisprudence may not be. In this respect,
a judicial assessment of political lie and insult as negligible or low-value speech
corrupting electioneering, arguably dovetails with deference to regulation of the
electoral process to maintain its integrity. In Burdick v. Takushi,115 for example, a
restriction on write-in protest votes was upheld.116 Although assailed as inconsistent
with the protection of expression, it is not anomalous unless one assumes that all
review of regulation affecting the area of political speech should be particularly
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al33178 [https://perma.cc/QY2J
-JXJT], and Council Framework Decision 2008/913, 2008 O.J. (L 328) 55, 55, respectively).
113 William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 285, 285 (2004).
114 Id. For a particularly excellent consideration of the opinion in Alvarez and the impact
of undisciplined decision-making in the area of content based regulation, see Rodney A.
Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and
Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499 (2013).
Professor Smolla writes:
Visible in the spread of the three opinions in Alvarez are (1) the view,
represented by Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, that freedom of
speech occupies an exalted position, rarely trumped by other societal
values, (2) the view, represented by Justice Breyer’s concurrence, that
freedom of speech deserves some elevated stature in the constitutional
scheme, but not a stature so elevated that it cannot be overtaken by well-
crafted laws vindicating other significant societal values, and (3) the
view, represented by Justice Alito’s dissent, that speech may be divided
into that speech which serves some plausible positive purpose, which is
deserving of constitutional protection, and that speech which advances
no legitimate end worth crediting, yet is highly offensive to good order
and morality, which is not deserving of any protection.
Id. at 499–500 (footnotes omitted).
115 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
116 Id. at 441–42.
2017] A REVERENT REFLECTION 941
stringent.117 Although one scholar commented that the activity of write-in votes had
“obviously expressive dimensions [that should not] have been so easily dismissed
under traditional First Amendment doctrine,”118 she was arguably undervaluing the
compelling interest of electoral integrity. The importance of electoral integrity is a
necessary precondition to political discourse. Thus, the late Justice Scalia intimated
that the state interest in having an informed electorate and in protecting the integrity
of the political process was of such strength that the state would have greater power
to regulate election speech than other forms of speech.119 Writing in dissent in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,120 Justice Scalia stated:
The . . . question is whether protection of the election process
justifies limitations upon speech that cannot constitutionally be
imposed generally. . . . Our cases plainly answer that question in
the affirmative—indeed, they suggest that no justification for reg-
ulation is more compelling than protection of the electoral pro-
cess. “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right
to vote is undermined.” The State has a “compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its election process.” So significant
have we found the interest in protecting the electoral process to
be that we have approved the prohibition of political speech
entirely in areas that would impede that process.121
So too, Justice Breyer has indicated First Amendment considerations lie on both sides
of cases such as Burdick, and that the First Amendment presumption hostile to gov-
ernment regulation that lingers in the strict scrutiny standard is out of place in the
context of elections.122 Breyer’s insight reveals that the Court is beginning to grasp
how intermediate scrutiny has allowed commerce to be secured by the four-part
Central Hudson test, while on the political side placing false or insulting expression as
reflexively off limits under strict scrutiny jeopardizes electoral integrity. Of course,
confusion returns through the back door with the subsequent decision in Alvarez
finding First Amendment value even in false statements of fact.123 The lying accepted
as improperly limited in Alvarez is increasingly blamed for startling outcomes from
creating false democratic hope in the “Arab Spring,”124 priming the pump against the
117 See generally Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (reviewing regulation of speech
regarding promise to lower office’s salary as a break to tax payers).
118 Heather K. Gerken, Election Law Exceptionalism? A Bird’s Eye View of the Symposium,
82 B.U. L. REV. 737, 739–40 (2002).
119 McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378–79 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
121 Id. at 378–79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
122 Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002).
123 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
124 Thomas L. Friedman, Social Media: Destroyer or Creator?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016),
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EU and in favor of “Brexit,”125 the election of Donald Trump pursuant to exaggerated
claims of former Secretary Clinton’s indictability,126 and the rejection of needed con-
stitutional reform in Italy and the premature defeat of Italy’s Prime Minister. Even
Pope Francis has chimed in to remind Catholics that lying on the Internet is a sin.127
Sin it may well be, but Internet purveyors like Mark Zuckerberg have been slow to ac-
cept the causation or very much personal responsibility for the depths of deception.128
These competing positions are an echo of the distant issue of whether tobacco
advertising results in new tobacco users. Only the products or causes for alarm and
protest have changed.
The pros and cons of regulating false and disparaging statements to secure
electoral integrity is a topic more worthy of Professor Redish than continuing to
press for the merger of commercial and noncommercial speech. Distortion and lie
mislead the electorate and can become a “tool [that] is at once at odds with the
premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which eco-
nomic, social, or political change is to be effected.”129 Allowing false and disparag-
ing campaigning to go unregulated results in the now all too familiar downward
spiral of one spurious attack advertisement begetting another. Such campaigning not
surprisingly results in an increasing number of voters being alienated from the
political process. Moreover, to the extent reputational harms are inadequately com-
pensated under New York Times Co., there will be ever greater reluctance for the
highly qualified to stand for public election. The overall corruption of lie and insult
is insidious.130 Robert Bellah puts the matter squarely:
To a considerable degree the reputation of a community is re-
flected in the reputation of its representative figures. Indeed, it is
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/opinion/social-media-destroyer-or-creator.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/EFW3-489S].
125 Mick Hume, The Truth About Those ‘Brexit Lies,’ SPIKED (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www
.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/the-truth-about-those-brexit-lies-juncker-eu/18789#.WH
QciHpVL6F [https://perma.cc/QB4A-6ZUU].
126 Sapna Maheshwari, How Fake News Goes Viral: A Case Study, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/media/how-fake-news-spreads.html
[https://perma.cc/5H9L-KXRT].
127 Pope Pontificates on “Fake News,” Calls It a Sin and Likens It to “Sexual Arousal
from Excrement,” DAILY SHEEPLE (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.thedailysheeple.com/pope
-pontificates-on-fake-news-calls-it-a-sin-and-likens-it-to-sexual-arousal-from-excrement
_122016 [https://perma.cc/E35U-F8VJ].
128 Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Is in Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-is-in-denial.html [https://perma
.cc/WT7H-AW9H].
129 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
130 For a particularly thoughtful example of the insidious harms caused by lies in the
context of the campaign, see Gerald G. Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies
in the 21st Century, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1085, 1087 (2012).
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the founders and heroes of a community that to a considerable
extent give it its identity, and it is the memory of the sufferings and
achievements of exemplary figures that constitutes a community
as a community of memory and keeps that community alive.131
This is not to say addressing lie and insult in campaigns is without practical
problems. These challenges could, in theory, be made somewhat less daunting by
a voluntary application of editorial standards to Internet postings. Freedom is always
paired with responsibility; freedom of the press included. There’s one major diffi-
culty: The Internet since its inception is a public good with a commons from which
virtually no one and nothing is excluded altogether. There are a myriad of ways to
limit access to given content from bomb-making to the latest recording by Lady
Gaga, but keeping people from fabricated stories and spreading them on a self-
created blog or Facebook page is a different order of ideological censorship, let
alone technological difficulty, which has thus far been avoided except in places not
well known for human rights protection (viz. North Korea, China, Cuba). Neverthe-
less, any discussion of remedy for political lie and/or insult must always bear in
mind that freedom can be lost to both external oppressors as well as those who are
internally reckless or complacent. While Newton Minow once called television “a
vast wasteland,” seldom is the Internet condemned as sweepingly. In particular,
there are valuable collections online that take justifiable pride in their self-creation
and maintenance, such as Wikipedia, and which, while not perfect, is darn impres-
sive in terms of the observance of editorial and ethical standard. Moreover, the
online magazines and websites, such as the Huffington Post, Politico, and the Hill,
for example, are all privately maintained platforms to which the general public is not
ordinarily invited to submit content beyond short responses to articles written by
online “journalists.” Just as newsprint is guided by self-imposed standards of edi-
torial quality or accreditation, from the hiring of staff with journalistic talent and
training, to adequate sourcing, to pre-publication libel assessment, to the copy-editing
tasks from typeface to spelling, so too online publications could adopt and apply to
itself like standards of quality.
Yet, assume voluntary standard setting insufficient to dampen lie and insult,
what public avenues might be explored? Within the constitutional boundaries set by
New York Times Co., it is possible to envision more generous causes of action for
political defamation to some degree. While familiar, pursuing a more muscular
defamation cause of action has noticeable costs. To some degree, this adjustment of
common law liability will remove the conversation of matters of public concern
from the public square into the courthouse, a move that may leave the public less
well-informed. There is also the practical difficulty that no judicial or administrative
action is likely to be able to keep up with the swift and dynamic nature of a political
131 Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
743, 745 (1986).
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campaign and produce in real time an effective remedy for the impact of a false or
disparaging statement. Bringing in the judiciary or an administrative agency also
allows both entities to become an auxiliary attack device for the mean-spirited
candidate desiring to ratchet up political disagreement into an allegation of unlawful
behavior. Mr. Trump obviously thought he was gaining a political advantage by
announcing during the second debate that he would appoint a special prosecutor to
look into the activities of former Secretary Clinton.132
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,133 the Court observed that “‘[D]ebate
on the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms,’ not at the edges.”134 This is why this area, again, more
than the tweaking of review standards for commercial speech, warrants the wise
study and exposition of Martin Redish. Fashioning a remedy for lie and insult that
sensitively balances the First Amendment’s protection of disquieting and disturbing
speech with the electoral integrity is no easy task, as the multiple attempts to deal
with flag-burning reveal.
One public remedial avenue is conceivably a greater dependence upon govern-
ment speech. President Obama repeatedly deployed government speech to “correct”
what he perceived were the erroneous statements of Mr. Trump, and even to render
an overall pronouncement of Mr. Trump’s unfitness.135 The Court’s jurisprudence
has not fully limned what limits there are on government speech beyond the assur-
ance that the government cannot impose its view upon a dissenting citizen on pain
of loss of constitutional rights. But government can promote its point of view and
it need not justify its own expression with any level of heightened scrutiny. More-
over, the government can condition the use of public money (but not money held by
a prospective government program participant derived from other sources).
The appropriateness of looking to government speech theory as a possible
antidote to lie and insult is indirectly strengthened by precedent which limits govern-
ment speech where such limitation threatens the integrity of a government proceeding.
By parity of reasoning, government speech should not be looked to as a counterpoint
to lie and insult where the cure (overly didactic specification of “appropriate” speech)
would be worse than the disease (lie and insult). Just as a legal aid lawyer should not
have his private discussion with his client artificially limited in a manner that would
threaten the integrity of the judicial proceeding,136 it must be asked which would be
132 Patrick Healy & Jonathan Martin, In Second Debate, Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton Spar in Bitter, Personal Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/10/10/us/politics/presidential-debate.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2K4N-5YU8].
133 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
134 Id. at 781 (quoting EU v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222–23
(1989) (alterations in original)).
135 Michael D. Shear, Trump as Champion of Working Class? ‘Come On,’ Obama Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/us/politics/obama-donald
-trump-ohio.html [https://perma.cc/9ZAH-94FQ].
136 See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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worse: unchecked campaign lie and insult, or speech activity which is too meticu-
lously fly-specked in the course of a political campaign?137 President Obama could,
and did, mount his presidential government speech platform to denounce what
Obama saw as behavior and prevarications disqualifying of the presidency. How-
ever, President Obama made no argument (and had he made one it surely would
have required a compelling interest) that Mr. Trump was somehow obligated to stop
what Obama saw as base, lying, and insulting ways.
Of course, government speech is not limited to presidential statements. Indeed,
given the logical assumption the incumbent president will naturally side with a
fellow party member, it might well be more effective if government speech addressing
the corrosive aspects of political lie and insult might be assigned to the equivalent
of an independent agency, such as the FCC. Alternatively, and far less problemati-
cally from the standpoint of the First Amendment, a non-governmental, nonprofit
entity might be encouraged to take the issue up in the way that “fact-checking” as-
sociations have arisen domestically, and truth commissions have long been relied
upon to publicize human rights violations in foreign venues.
Yet, given the harm of campaign lie and insult, can more be done than merely
calling it out for shame? Might legislation be enacted, partially premised upon the
strength of government speech precedent as well as the spending power, that could
sanction a candidate found to engage in a consistent pattern of lying sufficient to
mislead a reasonable person? In answering, assume the sanction not to be draconian,
but nevertheless meaningful, as in, say, denial of the public monies raised via the
check-off box on individual income tax forms. One can readily anticipate the chal-
lenges to the proposed standard. What counts as a consistent pattern of lying? Does
the reasonable man signify a subjective or objective standard? Is the proposal
consistent with New York Times Co.? Need it be? These are unresolved questions,
but the damage of political lie and insult, if capable of identification,138 to the body
politic is real. The remedial possibilities—from self-imposed journalistic standard
to common law modification to greater use of government speech to a possible
statutory enactment aimed at securing the integrity of the electoral process—is a
discussion that is just beginning. While the sensitivities are many, the task of ad-
dressing lie in real time is not impossible. Professor Hasen indicates that the Sixth
Circuit Court upheld just such a state truth commission.139 The commission was
empowered to reprimand candidates for false campaign speech statements made
with actual malice.140 The Court of Appeals reasoned that “false speech . . . does not
137 Id. Like the enacted, but ultimately invalidated, limits on legal aid advocacy in Velazquez.
138 Admittedly, it will be more difficult to monitor and check insult than lie. Nevertheless,
the inquiry could conceivably identify expressions of hate and exclusion, especially exclusion
based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.
139 Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74
MONT. L. REV. 53, 61–62 (2013).
140 Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573, 575–76 (6th Cir. 1991).
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merit constitutional protection if the speaker recklessly disregards the truth.”141 The
court summarized:
What is happening in this case, with regard to the “truth
declaring” function of the Commission, is that the Commission
is making judgments, and publicly announcing those judgments
to the world, as to the truth or falsity of the actions and state-
ments of candidates and others intimately involved in the politi-
cal process. These activities are closely comparable to those now
carried on by many agencies of government.142
Would such truth declaring or labeling have any meaningful corrective effect?
There is evidence that private fact-checking has modestly improved the accuracy of
political discussion and lessened unwarranted attacks on character.143
CONCLUSION
It may be tempting to write lie and insult off as just part of the rough edges of po-
litical life. “Politics,” after all, said the late Tip O’Neill, “ain’t beanbag.”144 Yet, some-
thing is lost in the general acceptance of the false and the denigrating. For a good many
years, and perhaps still, schoolchildren were taught how a youthful George Washing-
ton admitted to cutting down the cherry tree because he could not tell a lie.145 The
low standard of the 2016 presidential campaign would have resulted in the unex-
plained disappearance of entire cherry orchards. Given the pervasiveness of recent lie
and distortion, would the general public even grasp the wry comment of Mark Twain
141 Id. at 577.
142 Id. at 579. Professor Hasen is not in favor of such commissions. See generally Hasen,
supra note 139. Professor Hasen views most of the mechanisms that previously were
available to address false campaign advertising to be diminished by the Alvarez case. Id. at
56. With respect to the truth commission he writes, “it is not clear that it is a desirable approach
to the problem of false campaign speech. A government truth-declaring function is subject
to selective enforcement and political manipulation.” Id. at 76.
143 Alexios Mantzarlis, Opinion, Fact Check: This Is Not Really a Post-Fact Election,
WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fact-check-this-is-not
-really-a-post-fact-election/2016/10/07/7ef5f8fa-85c0-11e6-92c2-14b64f3d453f_story.html
?utm_term=.19741721fd28 [https://perma.cc/G6Z3-X98D].
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(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.readingeagle.com/news/article/editorial-walker-right-gop-sending
-wrong-message-to-voters [https://perma.cc/LK8N-WN3W] (also noting that the original quote
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145 Jay Richardson, Cherry Tree Myth, MOUNT VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org
/digital-encyclopedia/article/cherry-tree-myth/ [https://perma.cc/8ECK-RKE7] (also noting
that this story is actually a myth).
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that he was unimpressed by the young Washington since he (Twain) could tell a lie, but
chose not to?146 In 2016, it is not clear any candidate was capable of such restraint.
Jurisprudentially, there is some common cause to be located in considerations
of the proper standard of review for commercial or noncommercial speech, and the
present problem of lie and insult. Any theory that seeks to explain why protection
is extended to some speech but not others depends upon a claim that truth exists,
that it can be known, and that knowing it, it is better to have one’s behavior coincide
with what actually is true. To be at war with one’s own nature or to live in an al-
ternative reality is often foolish or irrational or both. These are large thoughts, and
millennia of philosophers have sought to definitively accept or disprove the self-
evidence of moral reality. It will not be a discussion concluded until the world as we
know it will also be concluded. None of us know whether that “day of judgment”
is centuries into the future or before the reader finishes this sentence.
In the twenty-first century, learned men and women are still drawn to the
knowability of human nature, but we too quickly retreat from what seems logical,
but interpersonally unprovable. Nevertheless, it is rather generally hoped that men
and women do view their natures in a sufficiently similar way to treat each other with
dignity, and in so doing, sustain community, including the community of a nation.
Libertarian claims for human freedom in America, and worldwide, have depended
upon a good deal of restraint when it comes to proclaimed truth, and especially when
its acceptance depends not on provable reason, but enforcement by law, regulation,
or other aphorism for coercion. Such restraint or prudence manifests itself in differ-
ent ways, and among them are endless philosophical musings over matters of natural
law, which no philosophical system premised upon reason has ever escaped.
When lawyers of the brilliance and welcoming nature of Martin Redish come
upon the stage, they do not ignore these large questions, but inspire both progress
and greater agreement by a sensible refinement of the philosophical scope of the
quandaries. Knowing that the nation, itself, began modestly with truth declared self-
evident—that is, asserted without proof—scholars of the high quality of Professor
Redish give us something a bit more manageable to resolve147 such as arguments
about the status of commercial speech, and more to the interest of this Essay, whether
what is concluded about the status of commercial speech gives us any useful clue
as to the constitutional status of lie or insult in political campaign.
Whether commercial speech is accepted as of high or intermediate value; whether
there is greater faith in arguments in favor of categorical exception than balancing;
and whether lie and insult are necessary to the pliability for democracy, someone’s
146 George Washington, TWAINQUOTES.COM, http://www.twainquotes.com/Washington
_George.html [https://perma.cc/D9YY-7F9L].
147 Professor Koppelman would dissent, finding such manageability to be merely tunnel
vision that results when a syllogistic discovery of the purposes of the speech leads to pro-
tection of commercial speech without a full consideration of consequences. Koppelman,
supra note 44, at 718–19.
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view of these matters will be treated, if not true, then as worthy of respect. Who
makes that call may be a theocrat, an ayatollah, a democratic legislature, a minority-
protecting judge, or ourselves. The competence claimed for one over the other of
those “authorities” is itself a never-ending debate which can often be softened—and
softened it must be—if we are to live in a peace greater than the mere absence of
war, which, given present-day Syria, Libya, and Iraq, would be great enough.
In the near term, a good start would be to explore whether the search for truth
is furthered by judicial decisions that find value in intentional lies, and, as one author
put it, “[t]his remains true even if we take account of indirect effects, slippery slopes,
vague boundaries, chilling effects, breathing spaces, imprecision of language, and
the risks of judicial error.”148 The legal enterprise is better equipped to meet these
challenges because Martin Redish has not been timid in his effort to secure the
freedom of speech.
148 R. George Wright, “What Is That Honor?”: Rethinking Free Speech in the “Stolen
Valor” Case, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 847, 853 (2013).
